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The American Medical Association and Congress:
Disproportionate Power?
by
Clifford Roy Strachen

Introduction
Probably none of the founders of the American Medical Association in 1847 could have
imagined the size and strength the organization would have over a hundred years later
(Ippolito and Walker 1980). Over the past
fifty years the AMA has become a major
influence in health politics in America.
From the defeat of President Truman's
comprehensive national health insurance
initiatives in the 1940s (Feldstein 1988), to
the airline smoking bans in our day (AMA
1989), the AMA has exercised enormous
political power in Washington.
Considering that the medical profession
can only boast of a few of their associates in
Congress (two physicians, a dentist and a
public health educator in the Wist Congress) (Duncan 1989), and that physicians
themselves are only a small percentage of
the total U.S. population, the AMA wields

disproportionate influence relating to "the
development and implementation of [health]
policies" (Ippolito and Walker 1980, 295).
I will examine the relationship between the
American Medical Association and the
Congress of the United States to seek an
understanding behind the power of the
organization.
In doing so, I will discuss the history of
the AMA regarding its efforts to defeat the
many national health insurance policies
which have been proffered by their proponents. Then I will delve into the American
Medical Political Action Committee
(AMPAC) to show the enormity of the
AMA's power in electoral politics and its
influence on the policy process in Congress.
Finally, I will discuss the AMA's efforts in
the WIst Congress and the specific issues
being addressed therein.
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The AMA

as an Interest Group

Professional associations are frequently quite
successful in interest group politics. Their influence is important because the professions control
some of the most important services available to
the American public. How government regulates
such activities as the delivery of health care and the
distribution of justice has a great impact on the
standard of life enjoyed by American citizens. The
political activity of such groups, then, has a direct
effect on the daily lives of Americans. The professional societies have been relatively effective in
pressure group politics for a number of reasons.
First, most such groups represent a large segment
of the profession, and therefore speak with considerable authority. Second, the professions represent
areas of knowledge not readily or completely
understood by nonprofessionals.
Therefore,
government officials are likely to defer to the
expertise of the professional association on matters
relating to the practice of that profession. Third,
the professional societies are comprised generally
of high status, well-educated, economically privileged persons. This endows the societies with a
very favorable image as well as a reservoir of high
quality talent from which to draw. And fourth, the
professional societies normally have access to
substantial economic resources which may be used
to promote the goals of the group. The real key to
the success of such groups, however, is the maintenance of high membership rates. For such a group
to be consistently effective, it must be able to speak
as the representative of the profession, and only
earning the allegiance of the members of the
profession permits such an advantage. In order to
achieve this goal, the professional associations must
provide an attractive array of incentives, normally
consisting of both material and solidary benefits
(Ippolito and Walker 1980, 296-97).

The above quotation outlines some very
important features of professional associations like the American Medical Association. First, the AMA represents more than
half the physicians in America, as it has
since 1912. (Ippolito and Walker 1980). At
its peak in the 1960s it claimed as its membership nearly three-quarters of all practicing physicians.

Second, the medical profession is a field
which most do not understand or know well.
Congress and the Health and Human Services Agency (formerly Health, Education and
Welfare) readily allow the AMA to testify
before hearings and to offer suggestions on
health policy.
Third, even though Dr. Joseph Hatch,
prominent in Utah's state delegation to the
AMA, claims that the term "rich doctor" no
longer applies in America, medical practitioners still earn higher incomes than most
other professionals or laborers. The public
still holds the AMA in high regard according to a 1976 Gallup poll which showed the
AMA and the American Dental Association
holding higher public confidence than the
National Rifle Association, the American
Bar Association, the news media, labor
unions, federal agencies and business corporations (Campion 1984).
Finally, the AMA and the American
Medical Political Action Committee
(AMPAC) have been able to raise tremendous amounts of money to pursue their
agenda. Dr. Hatch (1990) figures that their
success lies in collecting dues and donations
from only twenty percent of its members.
There is a common perception that
"Congress has been afraid to take on runaway physician costs [or many health related
issues] because of the immense political
clout of the American Medical Association"
(Rovner 1989, 387). The AMA led the
defeat of Truman's proposal in the 1940s,
Carter's 1979 bill on hospital cost containment (Feldstein 1988), and a host of other
proposals in the past fifty years. The AMA,
opposed to government interference and
regulation in health care, is responsible for
the stigma of "socialized medicine," a label
it often used in congressional hearings, and
in their media and grassroots campaigns
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against Truman and others (Congressional
Quarterly 1968).
The AMA "doggedly fought every major
proposal which would lead to a change in
the relatively independent status of the
individual medical practitioner" (Ippolito and
Walker 1980, 294) and continues to look
after the "common economic interests of all
physicians [and] the maintenance of f~-for
service practice without government mfluence" (Feldstein 1988, 42). Dr. Hatch
(1990) refutes the charge that the AMA "is
just out to increase [its] pocket books" by
noting AMA efforts at banning smoking on
all airline flights, its push for alcohol warning labels, and its pressure for universalizing
childhood immunizations.
Yet, while the AMA has been somewhat
successful in these policy areas, it has been
relatively ineffective, Greely (1989) argues,
in promoting its own self-interests. Perhaps
the AMA' s greatest triumphs came in its
ability to rally others around specific causes,
especially "social medicine" in the 1940s.

National Health Insurance and the AMA
Any discussion on the AMA' s influence in
Congress must include, at the very least, a
cursory summation of efforts towards National Health Insurance (NHI) in this country (see Appendix). Stunned by Truman's
victory in the 1948 presidential race, in
which he campaigned for "a package of
social benefits that included a program of
compulsory national health insurance" (153),
the AMA quickly moved "to oppose the
enslavement of the medical profession"
(154). The AMA has been, and continues
to be, the staunchest foe of "socialized
medicine. "
The key issue in government-provided
health care, from its early roots in

Roosevelt's Social Security package of 1935
until this day, has been aptly enunciated by
Feldstein:
Should the federal role be limited to assisting the
indigent, by means of federal grants to the states
under the public assistance (charity) programs? Or
should the federal government assume a broader
responsibility and undertake to pay for the medical
and hospital costs of the entire population, or at
least specified age groups, without regard to the
financial status or ability to pay of the aid recipient" (1988, 77)?

The NHI issue has evolved considerably
since 1935. From Truman to Kennedy the
debate continued but nothing significant
occurred.
Bills introduced in Congress
usually died in Committee. The battle lines
were effectively drawn. Proponents of NHI,
including such groups as the AFL-CIO,
independent labor unions, and senior citizens
groups saw the need to extend health care to
the many senior citizens, and poor who
could not afford adequate health care. Main
opponents of NHI included the AMA, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, state manufacturing associations, drug companies, and
insurance groups (Congressional Quarterly
1968).
Realizing that it was losing ground to
NHI momentum, the AMA continued its
grassroots letter writing campaign and work
on ways to improve health care for the aged.
This resulted in the AMA's "Eldercare"
proposals--a voluntary method of health
insurance for the elderly (Congressional
Quarterly 1968). Throughout the period,
the AMA and its allies encouraged voluntary
private health insurance and did not oppose
federal aid to destitute and low-income
persons who would qualify under state
welfare programs. In 1950, Congress authorized federal grants to states for medical
care for those under public assistance (Congressional Quarterly 1968).
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Lobbying efforts in the period 1957-1965
were intense and directed at both Congress
(to sway votes) and "at the public to educate
and create consciousness" (Ripley and
Franklin 1980, 165). At a 1961 hearing the
"Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Abraham A. Ribicoff, accused the
AMA of using 'a bogeyman of socialized
medicine' to frighten people into opposing
the administration plan for health care of the
aged". President Kennedy countered "the
bogeyman" by insisting an "absolute freedom of choice . . . was guaranteed"
(Worsnop 1961, 582).
As the 1960s progressed, it became
evident that some form of government health
program was to become a reality. Still, the
AMA fought on, spending $1.2 million in
its Washington lobbying efforts and in two
nationwide publicity campaigns (Congressional Quarterly 1968). These included (as
major efforts do today) letter writing campaigns, media blitzes, visits of association
members to their Congressmen, and inducing state and local governments to make
statements favorable to the AMA position.
The AMA spent $829,484 for exposure in
one hundred daily newspapers, radio, and
television during the first quarter of 1965
when the Medicare bill was being considered.
Ripley and Franklin quote Theodore
Marmor on the Medicare debate:
[The] debate [was] cast in terms of class conflict.
. .. The leading adversaries ... brought into the
opposing camps a large number of groups whose
interests were not directly affected by the Medicare
outcome. . .. Ideological charges and countercharges dominated public discussion, and each side
seemed to regard compromise as unacceptable. In
the end, the electoral changes of 1965 reallocated
power in such a way that the opponents were
overruled.
Compromise was involved in the
detailed features of the Medicare program, but the

enactment itself did not constitute a compromise
outcome for the adversaries (1980, 164-65).

In any case, Medicare, and Medicaid
soon came into being. With them, health
expenditures as a percentage of GNP have
risen dramatically in 25 years. Regulation
.
'
It seems, has tended to hide symptoms Gust
as the AMA feared) while exacerbating the
real problems, creating a cartel" for the
regulated sectors in the industry (Enthoven
1977). Instead, the AMA argues, we need
to be more concerned with types of national
health insurance since it now exists in varying degrees and forms for different groups.
II

The AMA/AMPAC Relationship
As the AMA has grown, its interests, activities, and membership have become diverse.
In 1965 the organization created the American Medical Political Action Committee to
separate the different aspects of the AMA
into cohesive units of operation in the power
game. The AMA continues to concentrate
on its Washington lobby activities--trying to
persuade people through its grassroots
movement and by direct pressure on Congressmen. The AMA remains "a distributor
of valuable information regarding the status
of the nation's health and the diagnosis and
treatment of disease" (Ippolito and Walker
1980, 294). Indeed, the AMA recognizes
"the political, as well as the societal, advantages for supporting medical research"
(Feldstein 1988, 156). The AMA remains
the nation's premiere professional association due to its large size, the skill of its
organization, and its financial clout. AMA
activities continue to include national publicity campaigns in the media, educational and
research programs, and especially, its Washington Lobby. AMPAC has become an
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Since
effective arm of the AMA.
AMPAC's domain is electoral politics it has
become expert in the tactics of campaigning,
raising and spending money, and much
more.
As a money raiser, AMPAC has done
very well. In 1981-82, $2.5 million was
raised; $1.7 million of that was contributed
to Congressional elections. These totals
were second (in both categories) only to the
National Realtors PAC (Sabato 1984, 2021).
In 1983-84, AMPAC raised
$4,032,365 of which 46 percent was directly
contributed to candidates and another 11
percent was used in independent expenditures (Stanley and Niemi 1988, 147). 198586 was an even better year for AMPAC: it
raised $5.4 million and contributed $2.1
million to federal candidates (148).
AMPAC consistently ranks in the top ten
(often in the top five) campaign spenders
just as the AMA did before AMPAC. From
1946-1966, the AMA ranked among the top
lobby spenders, topping the list four times
(Congressional Quarterly 1968). Since its
inception in 1965, AMPAC has continued
the tradition of strength.
Interestingly
enough, Dr. Hatch contends that these
numbers are being reached from the donations of only 20 percent of the total membership. Per capita (in the AMA), these
numbers represent a thirty-six to thirty-eight
dollar contribution. AMPAC is raising
some $2.5 million dollars per two year
election cycle.
Close relationships are important to the
AMA and AMP AC since it is these ties that
help when the pressure is on for specific
legislative measures. Dr. Hatch pointed out
that AMNAMPAC have close ties to many
in Congress (some of whom are spouses or
children of physicians). One reason ophthalmologists are so involved, he suggested,
has been the budget cuts specifically affect-

ing their specialty. In recent years, Congress has reduced Medicare funding for
cataract surgery six times because that line
on the budget was much larger than prostrate surgery, which affects a larger portion
of the population (Hatch 1990).
Dr. Hatch and AMPAC feel fortunate
for their close relations with all of Utah's
Congressmen. Especially impressive was
Hatch's intimation that First District Representative Jim Hansen and Leon Sorensen, an
executive vice-president ofUMPAC (Utah's
Medical PAC), "signed each other's temple
recommends, " since Bishop Sorenson (in the
LDS Church) and Stake President Hansen
lived in the same ward. "It is just possible
that when those two talk on the phone they
understand each other" (Hatch 1990).
Moreover, Hatch maintains, the Utah delegation of the AMA has close, personal ties
with all of Utah's Congressmen. Incidentally, UMPAC actively supported Dean
Bristow, a physician who ran for Howard
Nielson's vacated Third District seat.
Sometimes, however,
the AMA faces a problem when a doctor runs for
Congress and the group's staff prefers his opponent. ·We can be under a lot of pressure from our
membership to give to the physician,· said an
AMA official (Congressional Quarterly 1982,46).

In any case, AMPAC supports favorable
Congressional candidates. This is part of "a
friendly incumbent policy. We always stick
with the incumbent if we agree with both
candidates" insists Peter Lauer, executive
director of AMPAC (Sabato 1984, 72).
However, as Ornstein and Elder point out,
"the AMA is especially aggressive" (1978,
62) in pursuing negative endorsements
(denying campaign support) in favor of an
incumbent's rival. In 1980, AMPAC funds
were used to defeat Representative Andrew
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MacGuire (D-NJ) , because he had proved
difficult to work with (Sabato 1984).
On the other hand, AMPAC has rewarded others, who in 1982, voted favorably, or
cosponsored a bill exempting professional
organizations from Federal Trade Commission regulations: the AMA and the American Dental Association gave more than $1.5
million during the 1982 election (Sabato
1984). In 1964, as an earlier example,
AMA funds were used on House Ways and
Means Committee members who had opposed Medicare's predecessors in the past.
The AMA and AMPAC are notably bipartisan, says Hatch. Ornstein and Elder support
this notion "noting that the California Medical Political Action Committee gave money
in 1974 to both extremely liberal Democrats
(like Ron Dellums) and extremely conservative Republican's (like Barry Goldwater,
Jr.)" (1978, 72-73).

AMPAC's Political Activities
AMPAC's activities are probably wider than
most people suspect. Dr. Hatch pointed out
that there are more activities under the
Department of Political Education than
under the Department of Political Action.
However, one should not lose sight of the
obvious imbalance in expenses on the latter
side. I have already discussed direct contributions above and must now address independent expenditures and in-kind services.
"In-kind" contributions are those which
are tangibles--a service, or activity--rather
than monetary. One of the more common
examples of this are the "meet and greet"
receptions AMPAC hosts (AMPAC 1990)
where physicians and politicians meet together in order to discuss politics or medicine, always with the intention of promoting
a specific candidate or candidates while

encouraging individual contributions.
AMPAC places much emphasis on personal
relationships with the candidates it backs.
Another effective in-kind contribution
AMPAC favors is the "benchmark survey. "
This is where "AMPAC contracts with
nationally recognized consultants to conduct
polling on behalf of a Congressional candidate, then presents the results to the campaign" (AMPAC 1990). The law allows a
"sixty-one day rule" which "permits a PAC
to depreciate the cost of a poll by 50 percent
if it waits sixteen days . . . to deliver it, and
by a massive 95 percent if delivery is postponed more than sixty days" (Sabato 1984,
94). AMPAC conducted surveys for thirtysix candidates in 1982 at a cost of $380,000
but reported only $89,000 by following
these guidelines.
I have mentioned in passing the use of
independent expenditures in campaigning.
AMPAC's use of independent expenditures
began in 1978, and have been very effective
for them in a number of campaigns.
AMPAC has undertaken, according to the
AMPAC pamphlet, "only those expenditures
which can be viewed in a positive and informative light" (1990). Independent expenditures are exactly that: independent of the
candidates for whom benefit is intended.
The AMPAC has made extensive use of
television and radio spots, magazines, newspapers, billboards, and mass mailings in
campaigns around the country. "In 1982, it
spent $212,000 on television and radio spots
and targeted direct mail for thirteen House
candidates. In previous elections, AMP AC
paid for buttons and magazine advertising
independently" (Sabato 1984, 107).
Under its political eduction program,
AMPAC seeks to educate the public to the
realities of health care and politics and to
improve candidates' responsiveness to constituent issues after the election. Of course,
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the premise behind these activities is that
when the AMA needs to exert its influence,
it will have a Congressman who will respond.
AMPAC utilized 50 percent of its budget
on political education in 1984. Regional
seminars stress voter registration, get-out-tovote-drives, and telephone contacting.
Through activities such as Participation '92,
AMPAC encourages physicians and their
spouses to obtain delegate status to national
party nominating conventions (Hatch 1990).
Dr. Hatch promotes AMPAC's candidate
and campaign management schools. He
argues that what they do is to give some
prime motivation and expertise in running
for Congress. Candidate Dean Bristow,
whom I mentioned previously, made his
decision to run for Congress after attending
these programs. Representative John Bryant
of Texas commented:
Anytime someone, whether a person or a PAC,
gives you a large sum of money, you can't help but
feel the need to give them extra attention, whether
it is access to your time or, subconsciously, the
obligation to vote with them Sabato 1984, 126).

While the idea of a "subconscious obligation" may indeed be a factor, AMPAC
President Peter Lauer denies any connection
between AMPAC money and legislative
issues. Common Cause, however, purports
that a significant relationship exists between
AMPAC donations and votes in Congress.
Sabato writes:
Common Cause cited the defeat of President
Carter's Hospital Cost Containment Act of 1977 as
an example of AMPAC's influence. Of the 234
House members who voted for a crippling amendment to the act, 202 had been given $1.65 million
in contributions during their 1976 and 1978 campaigns, with an average receipt of over $8,100 per
member (1984, 132).

Sabato, however, is quick to point out that
"correlation does not prove causation"
(132).
AMPAC has what Sabato calls, "the
most elaborate national-state PAC arrangements" and notes that "several of AMPAC's
forty-eight state associates (including those
in California, Texas, and Illinois) are among
the largest state PACs in the country" (119).
AMPAC works with its state counterparts
like the Utah Medical Political Action Committee to raise funds jointly. According to
their guidelines, however, the two must
keep their monies separate and for the purposes intended.
The Utah chapter of
AMPAC may donate to Utah Congressmen
or others in Congress but UMPAC, alone,
can donate to campaigns for the Utah legislature. AMPAC looks to its state associates
for its grassroots strengths and for information on congressional races (Hatch 1990).
The relationship between the AMA and
AMPAC is interesting. According to the
campaign reform laws of 1971 and 1976,
funding for the two must be kept separate.
Each has its specific jurisdiction--the AMA
is a lobby and public educator, and AMPAC
is a political arm created to influence electoral politics. To this end, AMPAC contributes over $1 million per year (Ippolito and
Walker 1980). The technically separate
relationship between the two leads to contradicting behavior since the AMA may decide
it needs to lobby a specific Senator while
AMPAC may find it in its interests to effectively ignore the same Senator. I think,
however, that such conflicting behavior is
rare.
AMPAC is concerned about campaign
finance reform, says Dr. Hatch (1990). He
does not like the $5,000 limits on campaign
contributions, but recognizes their value in
preventing wholesale purchases of elections.
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The AMA and the 101st

Con~

Health care today, as good as it is for those
who have it, is still unavailable to an estimated 33 million Americans who lack the
means to qualify for or purchase health
insurance programs (Associated Press 1990).
Congress, in its efforts to close this gap, has
introduced a bill requiring employers to
provide basic health insurance to all fulltime employees (Fuchs 1990). Fuchs contends that over 80 percent of the uninsured
are employed or live in families of employed workers. This problem could be
alleviated by the above mentioned bill.
Surprisingly, this bill in many ways
parallels the AMA' s latest proposal "Health
Access America" which Dr. Hatch discussed
in our interview. According to the Associated Press (1990), the AMA plan includes the
expansion of Medicaid to all who live below
the poverty level; requires employers to
provide health coverage and proposes tax
deductions to help with costs; provides risk
pools for the uninsurable and tax incentives
for long term care insurance programs; and
changes the malpractice laws. In all, the
AMA proposal has sixteen points which, if
implemented, would cost an estimated $60
billion. The AMA declined to discuss the
financing of the proposal except to say it
"would require some increased taxes" (Associated Press 1990).
Perhaps the main difference between the
AMA's proposal and Congress' is cost
containment. Congress has discussed implementing a system based on the Canadian
model of a "fee schedule." The AMA, of
course, is opposed to most forms of cost
containment and would fight hard against it.
Many Americans prefer a system like Canada's but the AMA is quick to point out
Canadian weaknesses. James H. Sammons

(AMA executive vice-president) notes:
"The presumption that an awful lot of pe0ple seem to be making is that somehow
Canada has solved all of their problems.
That is erroneous. . . . It is not all peaches
and cream up there" (Rovner 1989a, 391).
The AMA particularly dislikes provincial
"expenditure targets" which control volume
by percentage reductions. Sammons labels
them "Russian roulette." Apparently,
the
AMA has endorsed the Medicare fee schedule, but opposes balance-billing limits and
expenditure targets, claiming such methods
"lead to rationing of health care, which
would have grave impact on the health and
welfare of our nation's elderly" (Rovner
1989b, 588).
The AMA is concerned that Medicare
and Medicaid are taking more than their
share of budget cuts. It is "a mistaken
impression that physicians have been relatively untouched by past budget cutting
actions" (U.S. Congress 1989, 140). Since
Medicare reimbursements and fees were
frozen in varying degrees between 1983 and
1988, physicians have borne the brunt of
some of these cuts. The AMA is determined not to be hurt by more. Therefore, it
supports a review of physician reimbursement and a revised payment system which
would dissipate inequities in the system
(U.S. Congress 1989).
Small businesses and other opponents
balk at the employer-provided health care
proposal since under the proposed guidelines
full-time workers (at minimum wage) would
be required to spend 19 percent of their
wages and half-timers 39 percent for basic
health insurance (Gajda 1987). Employers
contend that the higher operating costs
associated with the proposed insurance
programs would put many out of business.
At this writing, the program still has not
passed and probably will not.
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The AMA has been heavily involved in
current health care proposals. Major agenda
items include pressing for a quality review
agency within the Public Health Service,
alcohol warning labels, airline smoking
bans, new legislation to further reduce
tobacco product advertising, more lenient
children's disability coverage, and tax incentives for health care providers and selfinsurers. The AMA has already secured
some victories with regulatory relief from
bureaucratic and congressional encroachment. To be sure, the AMA will continue
efforts at securing legislation favorable to
the improvement of health care in America
while resisting government advances into
their domain.

Conclusion
From the first time the American Medical
Association labeled government provided
health care proposals "socialized medicine, "
the AMA has held a strong hand in American politics. The AMA and AMPAC have

been effective in the political process. The
AMA with its Washington lobby has done
much in the way of public health education
in Congress and toward the public.
The AMA has and will likely maintain
its status as a major mover for some time.
Together with AMPAC, the AMA is one of
the largest financial contributors to the
election process and the effects of that
influence have been, and will continue to be
felt for many years.
Having lost the Medicare battle, the
AMA has changed its tune in the last twenty
years--especially in the last ten. Today, the
AMA is concerned with improving the
quality of health care for all and easing the
financial burden of medical care on the
middle and upper middle class. The AMA
recognizes that public sentiment leans more
and more to NHI alternatives and now seeks
the next best alternatives where costs will
neither be prohibitive nor government interference rampant.
AMPAC is concerned, too, because
more stringent campaigning finance reform
laws would obviously weaken their influence
and position in the political establishment.

APPENDIX
Chronology on national medical insurance
1935 . . . . . . .
Roosevelt administration explores compulsory national health insurance as part of the
Social Security Act, but no legislation is recommended to Congress.
1943 . . . . . . .
Three Democratic Senators cosponsor a bill to broaden the Social Security Act to include
compulsory national health insurance to be financed with a payroll tax. No legislative
action.
1945 . . . . . . .
President Truman, in his health message, proposes a medical insurance plan for persons
of all ages, to be financed through a Social Security tax.
1949 . . . . . . .
The Truman proposal is considered and hotly contested in congressional hearings; no
legislative action results.
1954 . . . . . . .
President Eisenhower opposes the concept of national health insurance as "socialized
medicine." He proposes the alternative of reimbursing private insurance companies for
heavy losses on private health insurance claims. No action taken on this proposal.
1957 . . . . . . .
Representative Forand introduces the "Forand bill," to provide hospital care for needy old
age Social Security beneficiaries to be financed through increased Social Security taxes.
No action taken by Congress, but heavy AFL-CIO lobbying generates public interest.
1960 . . . . . . .
The Forand bill was defeated by the House Ways and Means Committee on a decisive
vote (17-8). Chairman Mills opposed the bill.
1960 . . . . . . .
As a substitute for the Forand bill, Congress enacts the Kerr-Mills bill, designed to
encourage the states to help older, medically needy persons (those not poor enough to
qualify for Old Age Assistance, but too poor to pay their medical bills).
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1960 . . . . . . .
Health care is an issue in the presidential campaign; Kennedy vows support.

1961-1964 ....
President Kennedy's version of the Forand bill is submitted annually in the House and
Senate, but the House Ways and Means Committee defeats it.
1962 . . . . . . .
Senate defeats an amendment to a public welfare bill embodying the Kennedy proposal
(52-48).
1964 . . . . . . .
The Senate passes (49-44) a Medicare plan similar to the administration proposal as an
amendment to the Social Security Act. The plan died when the House conferees (from
the Ways and Means Committee) refused to allow its inclusion.
Jan. 1965 ....
The 1964 elections brought many new Democrats to Congress, and the composition of
the Ways and Means Committee is finally changed to have a majority of Medicare
supporters.
Jan. 1965 ....
President Johnson makes medical care his number one legislative priority.
July 1965 ....
Medicare bill signed into law after passage in both houses by generous margins.
Compiled by Ripley and Franklin (1980, 163). Originally adapted from material in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965: 236-247.
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